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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE COURTROOM, THE
CLASSROOM, AND CANADIAN LEGAL LITERATURE
Stephen F. Ross*
In recent years, judges and scholars
in Canada and the United States are devoting
more attention to the theory and techniques
involved in statutory interpretation. Although
some advocate 'foundational" theories to
answer all theories of interpretation, most
difficult cases require a pragmatic approach
that requires analysis of the statutory text,
original legislative intent, and legislative
purpose in light of modern circumstances.
Morebver, the most difficult cases may not be
answerable by any of these approaches. In
difficult cases, judges often resort to
"normative canons" - rules they created to
further a jurisprudence they desire. These
canons need to be closely examined and
justified. This article closely examines one
American and one Canadian case, arguing
that an appropriate normative canon
interprets cases where the text, intent, and
purpose are unclear in favour of the party
least likely to have had its voice heard in the
legislatures and against the party most likely
to be able to secure legislative correction if the
court's decision is politically undesirable.
Depuis quelques annies, lesjuges et
lespersonnes lettries, au Canada et aux Etats-
Unis, accordent plus d'attention i la thiorie et
aux ragles d'interpritation des lois. Bien que
certains priconisent que les thdories
mfondamentalistes , offrent la riponse i tout
en matiare d'interpritation, ilfaut dans les cas
plus diffleiles adopter une ddmarche
pragmatique, laquelle comprend une analyse
du texte ligislatif, de l'intention originale du
ldgislateur et de l'objet de la loi dans le
contexte moderne. Dans les cas les plus
difflciles, d'ailleurs, ces mdthodes d'analyse
ne sontparfois d'aucune utilitdi. Aussi lesjuges
s 'en remettent souvent aux ff r~gles
normatives -v - c'est-i-dire aux r~gles
glaborges par eux ti l'appui de la
jurisprudence qu'ils favorisent. l convient
d'itudier ces r~gles et leurjustification avec
soin. L 'auteur examine une dicision
canadienne et une ddcision amdricaine et
argumente que la bonne application des rigles
normatives permet, lorsque le texte ligislatif,
l'intention du ldgislateur et l'objet de la loi
sont ambigus, de choisir une interpritation en
faveur de la partie la moins susceptible de se
vdhiculer son message aux Idgislatures et &
I'encontre de la partie la plus susceptible
d'obtenir des mesures correctives si la
dicision judiciaire est jugde politiquement
indisirable.
" Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B., J.D., University of California
(Berkeley). This article was written while the author was Visiting Scholar at the Faculty of Law,
University of British Columbia. The author would like to thank Dean Joost Blom, Associate Dean
Elizabeth Edinger and the UBC staff for resources and assistance in completing this project.
Financial support for the project was also provided by a David Baum Research Grant from the
University of Illinois. The author would also like to thank the participants in a workshop at the
University of British Columbia for helpful ideas and encouraging me to transform my remarks into
this article, Phil Bryden for countless hours of conversation on this and related projects, and
Carlos Ball, Jim Brudney, Bill Eskridge, Phil Frickey, Bob Lawless, Peter Maggs, Laurie
Reynolds, Ruth Sullivan, and Charles Tabb for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Statutory Interpretation
I. INTRODUCTION
Statutory interpretation is the Cinderella of legal scholarship. Once scorned
and neglected, confined to the kitchen, it now dances in the ballroom.
Although the interpretation of statutes has been an ongoing topic of interest
since the colonial period, only since the early 1980s have American legal
academics become intensely excited about statutory interpretation as an
object of theoretical interest. In that time, theories of statutory interpretation
have blossomed like dandelions in spring. They now eclipse theories of
common law and compete with constitutional law theories for space in the
public law agenda.
The efflorescence is overdue. As long as there has been law, there has been
statutory interpretation and insight into the topic is more practically relevant
now than ever before. In addition, the subject has been one of great
theoretical interest because of its historical connection with general theories
of interpretation and meaning. Although statutory interpretation theory has
lain in conceptual desuetude here in America, there are intellectual
opportunities for the field which can take it well beyond the work that has
been done in constitutional and common law theory.'
This essay is somewhat evangelical-its purpose is to encourage the Canadian
legal academy to devote more time in the classroom and in their scholarship to
understanding the theoretical bases of many interpretive approaches and to improving
on accepted techniques employed by judges to interpret statutes. Statutory interpretation
is not only among the most fascinating areas of study for legal theory, command of
interpretative techniques is also among the most important practical skills that litigators
and counsellors can bring to the task of serving their clients. Indeed, in another
important article, the author of the excerpt quoted above and his co-author suggest that,
although law professors posit abstract "grand theories" containing a single foundational
basis for statutory interpretation, lawyers and most judges approach the project of
interpreting statutes in a eclectic way, looking at the text, legislative history, the context
of the original enactment, the overall legal landscape, lessons of common sense, and
good policy.2
Glimmers of an enlivened discussion about statutory interpretation are apparent
in Canada. As Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubd recently noted, statutory
interpretation is "bound to become an essential part of the knowledge, skills and abilities
' W.N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994) [hereinafter Dynamic Statutory Interpretation] at 1.
2 W.N. Eskridge, Jr. & P.P. Frickey, "Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning"
(1990) 42 Stanford L. Rev. 321 [hereinafter "Practical Reasoning"].
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that contemporary jurists must possess."3 In Haida Nation v. B.C. (Minister of Forests),4
Esson J.A. included in his reasons a lengthy exegesis on the significant changes that he
thinks have been made between the second and third editions of a leading treatise on the
subject, complaining that the book's new author, Professor Ruth Sullivan, has
improperly transformed Elmer Driedger's approach to statutory interpretation from one
where the plain meaning of the text is given primacy to a more "contextual" approach.5
Yet, despite the implication in Justice Esson's analysis that the plain meaning approach
to interpretation remains dominant, judges and practitioners really use a pragmatic
approach to interpretation. Such an approach uses theoretically distinct (and perhaps
inconsistent) techniques that seem best suited to the resolution of the case subjudice.
Canadian judicial pragmatism toward statutory interpretation is evident both
from Haida Nation's survey of Supreme Court of Canada case law, showing support for
both the plain meaning and contextual approach,6 as well as an important discussion of
the issue in a recent article by Professor Sullivan.7 Sullivan critiques the inconsistency
in the approaches that the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada say they are using,
and employs insights from linguistics and psychology to demonstrate the shortcomings
of the plain meaning approach.
Although both Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 and Professor Sullivan catalogue
language in different Supreme Court opinions, altematively invoking the plain meaning
' 2747-3174 Quibec Inc. v. Quibec (Rigie despermis d'alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919
at 994, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (concurring opinion) [hereinafter Rdgie d'alcool cited to S.C.R.].
See also ibid. (quoting Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note I at 6-8 ("statutory
interpretation is the most important form of legal interpretation in the modem regulator, state").
4 (1997) 45 B.C.L.R. (3d) 80, 153 D.L.R. (4th) I (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Haida Nation
cited to D.L.R.].
' Haida Nation, ibid. at 6-8. Two key excerpts quoted in Haida Nation, ibid. at 6,
reflect these perceived differences. In E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1983) at 87, the "modem principle" was stated as follows: "the words of an Act are
to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with
the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament." In R.E. Sullivan,
ed., Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 131
[hereinafter Sullivan/Driedger], the "modem rule" was stated as follows: "courts are obliged to
determine the meaning of legislation in its total context, having regard to the purpose of the
legislation, the consequences of proposed interpretations, the presumptions and special rules of
interpretation, as well as admissible external aids.... An appropriate interpretation is one that can
be justified in terms of (a) its plausibility, that is, its compliance with the legislative text; (b) its
efficacy, that is, its promotion of the legislative purpose; and (c) its acceptability, that is, the
outcome is reasonable and just."
6 Haida Nation, supra note 4 at 10-14. See also Rigie d'alcool, supra note 3 at 1006-
08, L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
' R.E. Sullivan, "Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1998-1999)
30:2 Ottawa L.Rev. 175 [hereinafter Sullivan/Ottawa]. This is not to suggest that Professor
Sullivan is the only one harvesting these vineyards. See e.g. D.G. Duff, "Neuman and Beyond:
Income Splitting, Tax Avoidance, and Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada"
(1999) 32 Can. Bus. L. J. 345.
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and contextual approaches,8 Part I of this Article explains why L'Heureux-Dub6 J. was
perhaps being too idealistic when she complained that decisions from the Supreme Court
of Canada "lack[ed] a coherent and consistent methodology of legal interpretation."9
This part builds upon Professor Sullivan's recent critique of plain meaning to discuss
three "foundational" theories of interpretation, and to explain why none are sufficient to
resolve difficult cases of statutory interpretation. Because interpretive techniques may
be more or less appropriate depending on the specific issues in a case, an arguably
"inconsistent" pragmatic methodology might well be the best approach that can be
achieved. Part II introduces the important and often opaque role of "normative canons"
of statutory interpretation that are created by courts and reflect judicial rather than
legislative policy preferences. This part explains why normative canons are often
outcome-determinative. It will also provide justifications for some normative canons,
and explain how the use of these canons provides a sounder ground for the Haida Nation
judgment than either the plain meaning or contextual approach. Finally, Part III explains
the importance of statutory interpretation scholarship and suggests some key areas where
Canadian jurisprudence would substantially benefit from the targeting of the intellectual
firepower of the Canadian legal academy on this important subject. Acknowledging that
in some areas (such as grammatical canons), the American legal literature may be
applicable to Canadian jurisprudence, the part sketches some of the uniquely Canadian
issues that arise concerning the proper use of legislative history and the role of
administrative construction of statutes.
II. FOUNDATIONALISM AND PRAGMATISM
Jurists and academics in both the United States and Canada have endeavoured
to develop "foundationalist" theories of interpretation: approaches that provide judges
with comprehensive, coherent, and normatively attractive techniques to interpret
statutes. As Professor Sullivan demonstrated in her recent article, it would be an
understatement to observe that no consensus has developed, and that judges in both the
s See Rigie d'alcool, supra note 3 at 1001 L'Heureux-Dubd J. (citing own opinion for
the Court in Hills v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 513, 48 D.L.R. (4th) 193, for
a modem interpretation method that includes a pragmatic analysis of a variety of factors); Rigie
d'alcool, ibid. at 1006-1008 (complaining that the Court "is wavering at random" between
pragmatic and textual methods, citing: R v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 481
[hereinafter cited to S.C.R.] (textual); R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, 105 D.L.R. (4th) 632
(rejecting plain meaning); R. v. Lewis, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 921, 133 D.L.R. (4th) 700 (citing
SullivanDreidger, supra note 5, insisting that words must be read in context); and, Verdun v.
Toronto-Dominion Bank, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 550, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 415 (return to plain meaning));
and Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 181-187 (citing: Ontario v. C.P. Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1028
at 1049-50, 125 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (as an example of textualism); R v. McIntosh, ibid. at 712-713,
McLachlin J. (as an example of intentionalism); Rigie d'alcool, supra note 3 and R. v. Nova
Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 at 641, 93 D.L.R. (4") 36, Gonthier J. (as
examples of pragmatism)).
9 As stated by R.E. Sullivan in Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 178 (citing Rdgie
d'alcool, supra note 3 at 995-996, L'Heureux-Dub J.).
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United States and Canada rarely adhere to a single approach to statutory interpretation."
A recent development in the United States is the emergence of a strong movement led
by Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia calling for a return to an approach similar to
early-20th century British textualism, where judges give effect to the ordinary meaning
of the words used by the legislature, taken in the context of the entire corpusjuris. (As
Professor Sullivan demonstrates, the language used in a number of opinions, particularly
by Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, supports the textual approach," although not even
Lamer C.J. seems to follow it as consistently as Justice Scalia does.) Other judges use
textual and non-textual sources to implement their view that the overriding goal of the
judicial interpreter is to effectuate the intent of the enacting legislature. Yet others
suggest that judges should interpret statutes in light of the broader purposes that
underlay the specific statutory provisions.
This Part sketches three "foundational" theories of statutory interpretation.
Textualism relies primarily on the judge's perception of the plain meaning of the
statute's words, plus other grammatical and dictionary aids to interpretation and a
"benign fiction" that the legislature intends that the entire corpus juris be read in a
coherent manner.'2 Textualism generally eschews the use of techniques that explore the
legislative and political context in which the statute was enacted. Intentionalism is an
approach that uses: the judge's understanding of the text; grammatical and other aids to
linguistic interpretation; legislative history; and, the political context in which the
legislation was enacted-all with an aim to effectuating the intent of the enacting
legislature. Purposivism uses all of these techniques and a healthy dose of judicial
judgment as to the public purposes that underlay the need for the legislation, in order to
best carry out the statute's goals.
As the brief survey in this Part suggests, each approach draws upon
descriptively accurate and normatively desirable aspects of the legislative process and
the interaction between judges and legislatures. Ultimately, however, none is likely to
be fully successful in guiding the judicial interpreter. This Part concludes that judges
in reality draw upon the insights from each of these approaches to carry out their tasks.
In Part II, I suggest that none of these approaches, even in combination, provide a
confident or satisfactory means to resolve difficult cases, so that courts must and do
resort to judicially-created presumptions ("normative canons") to shape the outcome of
a case.
A. Textualism
The central thesis of textualism is that judges should interpret statutes based on
the ordinary meaning that a speaker of English would give to the statutory text.
Although textualists would deny that they are literalists, they limit their contextual
10 Ibid For a survey of the lack of consensus in the American academy, see generally
W.N. Eskridge & P.P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: statutes and the creation of
public policy, 2d ed. (St. Paul: West, 1994) [hereinafter Cases on Legislation].
" Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 181.
12 This phrase is from an oft-cited explication of textualism by Scalia J. in Green v.
Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504 at 527-529 (1989) (concurring opinion).
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inquiry to the statutory text (albeit including the entire body of statutory law) and
extrinsic linguistic aids, like dictionaries. Textualists firmly reject techniques that
employ extrinsic contextual evidence in order to permit a judicial interpretation that best
implements either the actual legislative expectations or the broader public purposes that
led to the passage of the statute.
There are at least two varieties of textualism. 3 The stricter version, currently
enjoying support among some prominent American jurists, adopts the "foundational"
view that the text is the sole legitimate source of interpretation. Under this view, only
what the legislature said is relevant, not what the legislature may have intended. Under
a softer view that seems more prevalent in Canadian opinions, the plain meaning of
statutory text is far and away the best evidence of what the legislature actually
intended. 4
Textualists believe in the primacy of text and the inappropriateness of using
broader context for several reasons. Formally, textualists believe that power is vested
in legislatures to pass law, not to declare intents or purposes, and that power is vested
in courts to apply these laws without regards to fairness or political context. 5 In their
view, contextual techniques create too much of a risk that judges will usurp legislative
policy judgments in the name of effectuating "purposes" or "intents" that are simply their
own policy preferences. 6 Even where judges are well-meaning, many lack the
sophistication about the political process necessary to separate reliable from unreliable
contextual evidence.' 7 In addition, textualists believe that adherence to plain meaning
is more likely to create a stable understanding of rules, while use of context is likely to
vary from one interpreter to the next, undermining the principle of the rule of law. 8
Much ink has been spilled about textualism that need not be rehearsed here."
Professor Pierre-Andrd C6td has written that deliberately ignorning non-textual,
contextual evidence "seems virtually to contradict the basic principles of linguistic
communication."2 Professor Sullivan's recent article develops this argument in detail,
drawing upon linguistic theory to demonstrate the inability of textualism to provide
13 "Practical Reasoning", supra note 2 at 340.
14 R. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., supra note 8 at 1049-1050. See also Sussex Peerage
Case (1844), 11 Cl. & Fin. 85 at 143, 8 E.R. 1034 at 1057 (H.L.) (precise and unambiguous words
"best declare the intention of the lawgiver").
' See e.g. A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997) at 9-13 [hereinafter Matter of Interpretation].
6 See e.g. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 at 473,
Kennedy J. (concurring opinion) (criticizing interpretation to fulfil spirit of legislation because the
"problem with spirits is that they tend to reflect less the views of the world whence they come than
the views of those who seek their advice").
"7 See e.g. K.W. Start, "Observations About the Use of Legislative History" 1987 Duke
L.J. 371.
S SullivanDrieger, supra note 5 at 26.
'9 For a compilation of some recent American articles supporting or criticizing
textualism, see W.N. Eskridge, Jr., "Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?" (1998) 96 Mich. L. Rev.
1509 at 1513 n. 10 & 13 [hereinafter "Unknown Ideal"].
20 P.-A. Ct6, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 2nd ed. (Cowansville: Les
1tditions Yvon Blais Inc., 1991) at 241-242.
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certain and objective answers to legal problems.2 To be sure, almost all questions of
statutory interpretation that are presented to lawyers and judges each and every day are
resolved by sole resort to the ordinary meaning of the statutory text. But these questions
do not wind up in court. Once difficult interpretive issues arise in litigation, interpreters
will inevitably be influenced by their own background and biases if they exclude
evidence of legislative intent and purpose - a point made by Professor Sullivan.'
Although in some cases contextual evidence points both ways, and judges may be
inclined to select the extrinsic evidence that is most consistent with their biases, in the
area of contract interpretation, Americans have recognized that extrinsic evidence will
serve to mitigate, not aggravate, this tendency.'
B. Intentionalism
The argument that the judiciary's primary mission should be to effectuate
legislative intent is grounded in the notion that judges should be faithful servants of the
legislature. This argument has normative appeal in a representative democracy.
Especially where judges accept that legislative intent should be paramount and seem to
prefer textualism as the most reliable instrument for ascertaining intent, a departure from
plain meaning is, in many cases, justified. A good example is Pepper v. Hart,24 the
precedent-breaking decision by the British House of Lords permitting reference to
Hansard in statutory interpretation cases. Despite a British rule of construction that
ambiguities in tax legislation are to be construed in favour of the taxpayer, a panel of the
Lords initially held that the plain language of the text supported Inland Revenue. On
reconsideration, their Lordships took account of the express statement, made by the
relevant minister before a parliamentary committee, that the statute adopted a
construction of "income" that was favourable to the taxpayer in the case. The second
decision noted that it would be ineffective and improper to prohibit members of
Parliament from relying on unequivocal statements made by a minister and to insist on
further statutory clarifications.'
As Professor Sullivan notes, a major problem with intentionalism is that it
imputes outcomes to the intention of the legislature not only in cases where this is
plausible but equally in cases where it is not.' This problem is exacerbated by two facts
of life about the legislative process: strategic voting, and underlying legislative
assumptions that prove to be incorrect over time. Some significant issues arising out of
the interpretation of the American Civil Rights Act of 1964 are illustrative.
2 Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7.
2 Ibid. at 200. Indeed, a frustration with the use of the text by conservative judges to
frustrate progressive social reforms in the United States (see e.g. F.J. de Sloov6re, "Extrinsic Aids
in the Interpretation of Statutes" (1940) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 527) eventually led the U.S. Supreme
Court to broadly embrace legislative history and reject textualism in United States v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
' See S.F. Ross & D. Tranen, "The Modem Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications
for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation" (1998) 87 Georgetown L.J. 195.
24 [1993] A.C. 593, 1 All E.R. 42 (H.L.) [hereinafter cited to A.C.].
' Ibid. at 633-634, Browne-Wilkinson L.J.
26 Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 222.
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The first concerns American judges' efforts to discern what Congress meant
when it prohibited employment discrimination on account of "sex" in that landmark
statute, in light of the fact that the provision was adopted by the House of
Representatives in a classic display of strategic voting. The legislation, as it emerged
from committee, prohibited discrimination only on the basis of race, colour, creed, or
national origin. During debate in the House of Representatives, an amendment was
offered to add "sex" to the list of prohibited criteria. The amendment was not offered
by a cutting-edge feminist, but rather by a leading segregationist representative from
Virginia, intent on making the entire bill unpalatable. Indeed, many northern liberal
representatives opposed the amendment for that very reason, while other northern
representatives were swayed by the passionate advocacy of several of the six women
serving in the House at the time.27 The amendment was adopted by a coalition of
northerners and virtually all the white southern representatives, with no legislative
debate or committee consideration of how a ban on sex-based discrimination should be
implemented. In cases like this, intentionalism does not provide a very helpful guide for
the judicial interpreter.
Another significant interpretive issue ill-suited to exclusive reliance on
intentionalism, because of outmoded legislative assumptions, concerns the legality of
affirmative action under the same Civil Rights Act. In 1964, many assumed that
removing race as a relevant criterion in employment and other commercial contexts
would indeed be sufficient to remedy past discrimination and achieve a full integration
of previously oppressed groups into the economy. When legislative sponsors of the Civil
Rights Act spoke of economically integrating African-Americans into the American
economy and of creating a "color-blind" society, they did not appreciate that those two
lofty purposes would, in the medium-term, come into conflict." How, then, to
determine whether voluntary ameliorative plans "discriminate on account of race" in
violation of the statute?2 9 If the "intent" of the legislature is how members would have
answered a hypothetical question in the abstract, many would concede that legislators
in 1964 would not have favoured affirmative action. But, if asked how a court should
decide the issue fifteen years later, especially if litigants presented persuasive evidence
that a legal prohibition on blatant racial discrimination proved insufficient to break down
barriers to employment, the intentionalist inquiry becomes unclear. And if asked the
"meta" question-whether courts should use post-enactment changes in society as a
contextual factor in interpreting statutes-the "intent" of the legislature might actually
support a broad, evolutive approach that could conceivably reach an interpretation
actually counter to the original expectations in 1964.
Intentionalism also raises normative difficulties when it is employed to
effectuate backroom deals for which elected legislators are unwilling to take the political
27 See Cases on Legislation, supra note 10 at 22-24.
28 By 1982, when the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted, the need for
ameliorative action was apparent. See Constitution Act, 1982, s.15(2), being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
29 See UnitedSteelworkers v. Weber, 433 U.S. 193 (1979). See also Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 1 at 14-3 1, for Professor Eskridge's critique of intentionalism in the
context of this statute.
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"heat," or that reflect outmoded but unexpressed social attitudes. Haida Nation provides
an example. The B.C. Forests Act permitted the Minister of Forests to grant tree farm
licenses to Crown land, but only if the land was not "encumbered." The Haida Nation
sought a judicial declaration that a particular license was invalid, because it was
encumbered by an Aboriginal land title claim. The government persuaded the lower
court that the phrase "encumbered" should be interpreted as limited to traditional forest
tenures. Among other arguments, counsel for the Crown employed the intentionalist
approach to claim that when the Act was passed in 1978, the government and majority
of the B.C. Legislative Assembly were quite hostile to Native land claims and thus
would not have intended to encompass such claims within the definition of a legal
"encumbrance.""0 Although the majority rejected this argument on "plain meaning"
grounds, there are significant normative problems with interpreting even an ambiguous
textual provision to effectuate legislative hostility or indifference toward politically
marginalised groups, two decades before the case was litigated. This would seem to be
especially true in a parliamentary democracy where the government can, with relative
ease, explicitly effectuate their social views by securing passage of new legislation.3
In her critique of intentionalism, Professor Sullivan suggests that courts
frequently refuse to effectuate legislative intent where to do so "would produce
unacceptable outcomes-outcomes that are unconstitutional, irrational, incoherent,
unjust, or unfair." 2 She correctly and astutely notes that when judges exercise discretion
to avoid outcomes they deem unacceptable under the guise of legislative intent, the
resulting lack of transparency mutes judical responsibility, rendering it unlikely that this
sort ofjudicial discretion will be critically examined. This process also "tends to empty
the notion of 'legislative intent' of real significance."3
A more transparent approach that would alleviate some of Professor Sullivan's
concerns would require judges to either ground their departures from specific legislative
intent in legislative expectations themselves, or to abandon intentionalism as a
foundationalist approach to interpretation. To the extent that a judge can conclude that
the enacting legislature itself would have found a statute's literal application to a
particular case to be unconstitutional, irrational, incoherent, unjust, or unfair, the judge
is faithful to intentionalism. In many cases, however, judges have no way of answering
this question.
C. Purposivism
This theory is based on the proposition that statutes are not enacted arbitrarily
or to further nefarious ends, but rather because our elected representatives believe that
legislative changes will improve the common welfare. Judges act as partners with the
legislature in this public-spirited endeavour, and interpretive judgment should therefore
further the purpose underlying the legislation. Although the approach is of ancient
30 Supra note 4 at 15. The lower court opinion is reported at (1995) 130 D.L.R. (4!h)
661, 15 B.C.L.R. (3d) 154.
s' This theory is discussed in Part II, below.
32 Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 224.
I bid. at 225.
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lineage,34 it was recast in the post-war United States as a means of adhering to the
principle of legislative supremacy without the rigidity and other problems of
intentionalism 5 Rather than ascribing to the legislature a specific intent that determines
the outcome of the litigation, the purposive approach assumes that the legislature may
not have considered the precise question at issue and seeks to resolve ambiguities
consistent with the broader public purposes that underlay the statute. Canadian
purposivism has been influenced by American case law, developments in linguistic
theory that stress the importance of purpose in determining meaning, and the civilian
approach traditionally used to interpret Quebec's Codes.36 This approach is alive and
well in Canada. Indeed, it is the dominant mode of constitutional interpretation,3 7 and
a "staple of statutory interpretation" in the Supreme Court of Canada.38
The purposive approach has not been without academic and judicial critics. Its
principal American academic proponents acknowledge that it is based on the assumption
that a statute is "the work of reasonable [people] pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably."39 Academic adherents to the "public choice" view of the legislative process
suggest that legislators are not motivated to enact legislation by the desire to remedy
defects in the current law for some reasonable public purpose, but rather seek to "sell"
legislation to supporters in order to secure re-election. Legislation often benefits small
numbers of citizens while burdening a great many, and public choice theory posits that
small special interest groups will be able to organize and lobby more successfully. As
a result, legislation does not reflect stirring public purposes, but instead resembles
commercial contracts.4" Advocates of this viewpoint suggest that judges should not
effectuate what they incorrectly perceive as a public purpose, but rather adopt an
intentionalist approach and simply give effect to the bargains struck in the legislative
" In Heydon's Case (1584), 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 E.R. 637 at 638, the court wrote:
for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or
beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be
discerned and considered:
1. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd
. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law
did not provide.
3'. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to
cure the disease of the commonwealth.
And 4"'. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all
the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief,
and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and
life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the
Act, pro bono publico.
3 "Practical Reasoning," supra note 2 at 332-333.
36 Ctd, supra note 20 at 318.
R . v. Big M Drug Mart, Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344, 18 D.L.R. (4"') 321.
38 Sullivan/Driedger, supra note 5 at 38-39 (citing Clarke v. Clarke, [1990] 2 S.C.R.
795 at 807, 73 D.L.R. (4"') 1.
39 H.M. Hart, Jr. & A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law, Tent. ed. (Cambridge, MA: 1958) at 1157.
4 See e.g., D.A. Farber & P.P. Frickey, Law andPublic Choice: A Critical Introduction
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
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process. 41
Two United States Supreme Court decisions involving employment
discrimination and the Civil Rights Act illustrate the differences between the purposive
and public choice approaches. In Weber v. United Steelworkers,42 the Court held that
ameliorative action did not constitute illegal discrimination on account of race. Justice
William Brennan's majority opinion was based in large measure on the view that the
statutory purpose was to economically benefit racial minorities. To find ameliorative
action illegal would "bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the
statute.143 The principal dissent used the same approach, arguing that the purpose of the
statute was to remove race entirely from any employment criteria.44
In contrast, the Court in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts45 held that
the statute did not permit race-conscious deviation from a seniority system for
determining layoffs. Rejecting the parties' efforts to re-litigate the purposive dispute in
Weber, Justice Byron White observed that the Act contained a specific statutory
provision protecting bonafide seniority systems from legal challenge: the provision had
been inserted at the behest of labour unions, whose political support for the entire
legislation was critical to its passage. Courts, Stotts concluded, should give effect to this
legislative bargain.46
Regardless of whether the insights of public choice theory are persuasive or
applicable to the Canadian legislative context, it is clear that many statutory provisions
do not reflect the legislature's laser-like focus on a single social problem, but rather
reflect a compromise between competing public purposes. Consider bankruptcy law.
In reality, bankruptcy law reflects an attempt at a fair balance between the needs and
legitimate interests of debtors, creditors, and other interests affected by the proceeding.
Although one could attempt to craft a single overriding public purpose at a very broad
level of generality to explain the various policy choices made in such legislation, such
an abstraction would be of little aid to a statutory interpreter.
Even where statutes do not reflect a balancing of conflicting interests, Professor
Sullivan has correctly observed that the legislature "almost never wishes to pursue its
goals at all costs or by any means, regardless of other considerations."47 Sullivan also
correctly observes that the characterization of legislative purpose can be indeterminate. 41
Weber is the most famous American example-in prohibiting employment
discrimination "on account of race," was Congress' purpose to economically integrate
4" See e.g. W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner, "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective," (1975) 18 J. L. & Econ. 875.
42 Supra note 29.
43 Ibid. at 202 (quoting from United States v. Public Utilities Comm 'n, 345 U.S. 295
at 315).
44 Ibid. at 252-53 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
45 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
46 For an analysis of Stotts along these lines, see F.H. Easterbrook, "Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System," (1984) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 55-56.
47 Sullivan/Driedger, supra note 5 at 62.
49 Ibid. at 60-62.
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African Americans into the American economy?4 9 To eliminate race as a lawful
criterion to achieve a colour-blind society?" Or was Congress' purpose based on ideas
or concepts that had quickly proved outmoded?5'
Although in some cases a purposive analysis proves helpful, in many cases its
value may be based on unrealistic assumptions about the legislative process, or evidence
of broad legislative purposes that can be used to support either party's version of the
statute. As such, it will often fail to provide the single coherent formula that resolves
many difficult interpretive issues.
D. Using 'practical reason "in lieu offoundationalist theories
Courts and practising lawyers tend to prefer a more pragmatic approach. This
suggests a recognition of the inadequacies of a single foundational approach to
interpretation. In some cases the textual language is unmistakably clear while the
evidence proferred by counsel seeking another meaning is of doubtful reliability. In
other cases one construction might be slightly preferred but reference to legislative
materials makes it clear that another meaning was unmistakably intended. Some
interpretations would clearly frustrate the statute's purposes; in other cases there is no
overarching purpose for an interpretation to frustrate. Judges seeking a sensible result
are not so ideologically wedded to one form of jurisprudence as to forego other
techniques.5 2
While adherents to foundational approaches reject interpretations and
interpretive techniques that are inconsistent with theory, Professors William Eskridge
and Philip Frickey suggest that judges and practitioners consider a variety of factors,
including those used by intentionalists, purposivists, and textualists. Pragmatists find
in easier cases that almost all the factors point in the same direction, and resolve the
more difficult cases based on the relative strength or reliability of the various factors
they have considered. 53  Their analysis places the variety of factors that are
pragmatically considered into three categories. First are considerations that relate to the
statutory text-factors given primacy by textualists. Included here is whether the text
seems to have a plain meaning, whether the interpretations set forth by opposing counsel
can fit within the statutory language, a variety of linguistic canons that shed light on the
meaning of the text, as well as the broader statutory context in which the text is used.
Second are considerations that relate to the original understanding of the text. This
category includes materials employed by intentionalists and purposivists, including
49 This was Justice Brennan's opinion for five justices in Weber, supra note 29 at 197
(although Blackmun J. concurred separately, see note 51 infra).
" This was the view of Justice Rehnquist, as he then was, for himself and Burger C.J.
in ibid. at 419.
"' This was the view of Justice Blackmun in ibid. at 209.
52 See e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 at 610 n.4 (1991)
(arguing that "common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional
information" from the legislative history "rather than ignoring it", and quoting United States v.
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 at 386 (1805) Marshall C.J.: "[w]here the mind labors to discover
the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived").
5' See "Practical Reasoning," supra note 2 at 352-354.
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evidence about whether the legislature actually considered the specific issue subjudice;
whether the political history of the legislation makes clear how the legislature would
have considered the issue, even if there is no evidence that it was consciously considered
(this technique is often called "imaginative reconstruction") 4 ; as well as consideration
of the interpretation that best furthers the general legislative purpose that led to the
statute's adoption.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, courts do take account of "evolutive
considerations"-how the statute has evolved over time.5 This can be "intentionalist"
where there is evidence that the legislature intended the courts to re-interpret statutory
enactments in light of modem circumstances.56 Even absent such evidence, courts will
construe broad phrases to effectuate legislative purposes where circumstances change
so that original expectations and purposes are no longer congruent.
Braschi v. Stahl Associates"7 illustrates this "dynamic" and pragmatic approach,
where the court used a variety of interpretive tools, re-examined preliminary conclusions
based on further inquiry, and applied the legislative purpose in a contemporary context.
Pursuant to New York City's rent control ordinance, the respondent sought to evict
Braschi from a rent-controlled apartment in mid-town Manhattan. The tenant of record
was Braschi's long-standing domestic partner. Braschi argued that he was exempt from
eviction because of a regulation that prevented any eviction of "either the surviving
spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family
who has been living with the tenant." The intermediate appellate court held that this
provision protected only "family members within traditional, legally recognized familial
relationships."" The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that including Braschi within
the protection of the statute best effectuated the legislative purpose.
The Court acknowledged two conflicting purposes: a desire to protect tenants
was "juxtaposed against" an overall objective of a gradual transition from a controlled
to market economy through free market rents on vacant apartments, so that "mere
roommates" should not be entitled to protection. The Court concluded that the
"intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal
distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of
' See e.g., Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation., 154 F.2d 785 (2d Cir.
1946) Hand, J. (ambiguity in statute granting employment seniority rights to returning soldiers
construed narrowly, noting statute enacted in 1940 when Congress contemplated a one-year draft
and did not envision the harrowing service that soldiers would be called upon to perform in World
War II). The term was popularized by Judge Richard Posner in his book Federal Courts: Crisis
and Reform (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
" "Practical Reasoning," supra note 2 at 358-362.
56 See e.g. Li v. Yellow Cab Company of California, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 at 866, 532
P.2d 1226 at 1234 (1975) (changing California tort law from rule of contributory negligence to
one of comparative negligence, based in part on Civ. C. §4 (1872), directing courts to interpret
code "liberally" and "with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice"). See also
Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-21, s.10 (law "shall be considered as always speaking, and
where a matter or thing is expressed in the present tense, it shall be applied to the circumstances
as they arise, so that effect may be given to the enactment according to its true spirit, intent and
meaning").
57 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49 (1989) [cited to N.E.2d].
51 Ibid. at 53 (quoting 143 A.D.2d 44 at 45, 531 N.Y.S.2d 562).
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family life."59 The Court bolstered its view with dictionary definitions of family broad
enough to encompass Braschi and his partner, and its view-clearly reflecting modem
sensibilities-that the tenant of record was more like a member of Braschi's family than
a "mere roommate."6"
Ultimately, the basis of the court's decision is not transparent. Although
observers might be tempted to conclude that the majority had simply rendered a victory
for gay rights because this ideology was closest to that of the judges, a fair-minded jurist
attempting to balance the legislature's competing purposes of tenant protection and a
humane, gradual conversion to free markets might well conclude that protecting Miguel
Braschi fully effectuated the former, and allowing long-standing domestic partners to
receive the benefits of the "family" exception would not unduly impair the rental
housing market, even in New York.
Braschi exemplifies the pragmatic process modeled by the "Funnel of
Abstraction" developed by Professors Eskridge and Frickey:6
greatrequitable cogency
'best ansver"
precedent tad application
legislative prpose
nogmalise € nconslrco
specific legislative intent
sords of the statute
greaterauthoitat secight
59 Ibid.
' Ibid at 53-54 & n.4. The concurring judge rejected the majority's broad holding in
favour of an interpretation emphasizing the harsh effect of eviction and the broad construction that
should therefore be given to the word "family" in this particular statute.
In light of the pragmatic reference to both text and context, Braschi can be contrasted
with A.G. Ontario and Viking Homes v. Regional Municipality of Peel, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1134 at
1139, 104 D.L.R. (3d) I at 5, where Laskin C.J. refused to interpret a 1908 statute authorizing the
placement of ajuvenile in a "suitable family home" as permitting the placement of a child in a
commercially operated group home (a concept that did not exist in 1908). The opinion makes
clear that a liberal interpretation to effectuate a statute's policies does not permit courts to interpret
the text beyond "what the language in which [the text] is couched may bear on the widest
reading."
6 The version of the funnel in the text is taken from W. N. Eskridge, Jr., & P.P.
Frickey, Teacher's Manual for Cases and Materials on Legislation and the Creation of Public
Policy, 2d ed. (St. Paul: West, 1995).
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The court began with the words of the statute, and found the word "family" to have no
plain meaning. Nor was there any evidence about any specific legislative intent
concerning the treatment of domestic partners. Although an imaginative reconstruction
of thirty year-old legislative expectations would probably have revealed an antipathy
toward gay couples, the court emphasized the legislative purpose of balancing fairness
to families with economic policies in favour of gradually deregulating rental markets.
Having located its most confident ground regarding legislative purpose, the court then
returned to the words of the statute to find dictionary definitions broad enough to
encompass domestic partners as a family.
Note that the "best answer" approach can be more complex than a knee-jerk
realist might suppose. A judge might favour or oppose Braschi's claim because of
sympathy or hostility to gay rights; they might favour or oppose his claim because of a
sympathy or hostility toward rent control; ajudge like L'Heureux-Dub might see the
case as a good one to advance the cause of dynamic interpretation; a judge like Esson
might see the case as a good one to limit the interpretation to his own "ordinary
meaning" of family. Given that the "best answer" is multi-layered, a single judge might
find these and other factors pointing in opposite directions. For example, a libertarian
judge might favour gay rights and deregulated housing markets.
Thus, the pragmatic application of the Funnel suggests that the variety of
relevant factors will affect different cases depending on their relative strength in each
case's specific context.6' This approach differs from the foundationalist approaches
discussed above in two fundamental ways. First, pragmatic interpreters do not exclude
evidence based on theory. Second, pragmatists do not moor themselves to effectuating
the original expectations of the legislature.
Although generally sympathetic with and inclined to embrace pragmatism,
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 cautions that it may not provide sufficient constraints for
judicial discretion. She is particularly troubled by her perception that this form of
interpretation would allow judges to "manufactur[e] interpretations that are diametrically
opposed to the clear purpose of a statute."63 Her concerns might also be applicable to
Professor Sullivan's version of pragmatism, which requires the judge to adopt an
"appropriate" interpretation that balances compliance with the text, the promotion of
62 To this extent, I would quibble with Professor Sullivan's suggestion that the identity
of considerations to be taken into account depends on the court's theory of interpretation. See
Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 181. As a descriptive matter, Sullivan finds that Canadian
judges embrace the pragmatic approach modelled by Eskridge & Frickey. See Sullivan/Driedger,
supra note 5 at 132:
Canadian judges are pragmatic rather than dogmatic in their approach to
interpretation. Where different indicators of meaning point in different
directions, they respond to whatever seems compelling in the circumstances,
given the language to be interpreted, the problem to be solved, the type of
legislation in question, what is suggested by the various contexts examined,
the importance of the rules or presumptions judged to be relevant, the
persuasiveness of other opinions and so on.
63 Rigie d'alcool, supra note 3 at 1010. See also Crtd, supra note 20 at 384
("interpretation in light of....consequences" brings "serious risks" of abuse, and "its scope should
therefore be circumscribed.").
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legislative purpose, and the achievement of an outcome that is "reasonable and just."' 6
Although these concerns are not without merit, they significantly short-change
each of these pragmatic approaches. Eskridge emphasizes that interpretation requires
a "fusion" of original expectations and current understanding, not simply a result that is
"just and reasonable" under modem standards.6" The Funnel of Abstraction emphasizes
that both imaginative reconstruction and legislative purpose have greater authoritative
weight than the "best answer" ajudge might develop. As I understand Eskridge, fair-
minded judges will deviate from the "clear purpose of the statute" only where: (1) doing
so is plausibly supported by text; (2) the original expectations in the statute clearly
reflect changed circumstances; and, (3) there is some basis for assuming, either at a
general level or in the specifics of the case, that the legislature's overall goals can best
be effectuated by a dynamic approach. Thus, the Eskridge approach would not allow,
for example, a bare majority of the Supreme Court of Canada to re-interpret the Canada
Health Act to permit a province to shred the principle of universal health care simply
because the five justices strongly believed that the Canadian health care system was a
policy disaster and that, therefore, the result was "the appropriate outcome." '6
Similarly, when Sullivan talks about justifications for departing from text or
intent, she makes it clear that judges should look to "the rest of the statute book, the
common law and the evolving legal tradition which draws on current social and political
values as well as those of the past,"67 not each judge's personal view of the just outcome
of the case at hand. Indeed, she suggests that those judges who insist that any
interpretive outcome be derived from a single source will not be able to single out and
assess those cases where text or intent genuinely do constrain the judge because of their
clarity and force in the particular case,6" thus facilitating the ability of judges to allow
their personal biases to opaquely creep into their reasons for judgment.
Judges continue to avoid adherence to a single, foundational theory of statutory
interpretation and instead rely on a combination of factors: the words of the statute;
evidence of the legislature's intent; and, the broad purposes that underlay the
legislation-both originally and as applied in the context of current social problems-to
Sullivan/Driedger, supra note 5 at 131.
6 Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note I at 60 (citing H.-G. Gadamer, Truth
and Method, 2d ed. trans. J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989) at 306).
See also W.N. Eskridge, Jr., "Spinning Legislative Supremacy" (1989) 78 Geo. L.J. 319
at 327-329 & n.26, where Eskridge employs an interesting analogy to illustrate how dynamic
interpretation is constraining and consistent with legislative supremacy in establishing policy
through statute. One analogy, drawn from F. Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, 2d ed.
(St. Louis: F.H. Thomas & Co., 1880) at 17-20, is of a principal who instructs a servant to
purchase five pounds of "soupmeat' each Monday. Eskridge argues that facing changed
circumstances not contemplated when the instructions were issued (e.g. "soupmeat leftover from
previous weeks", or the soupmeat at the store appeared to be spoiled), inconsistent directives from
the principal (e.g. instructions to prepare only low-cholestorol meals), or new overriding directives
(e.g. spend less on food), a faithful agent would and should construe the soupmeat instruction
dynamically and not purchase the five pounds as instructed. However, if the servant simply
became tired of soup, it would not be permissible to alter the principal's instructions.
66 Compare Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 185-186.
67 Ibid. at 226.
68 Ibid.
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resolve difficult questions of statutory interpretation. But overlooked in American
efforts to model the process of statutory interpretation, such as the "Funnel of
Abstraction", and under-emphasized in the Canadian literature, is the role of "normative
canons"-judicially-created default rules that often determine the results of difficult
cases. Why they are important, why they might be justified, and how their use might
be evaluated, are the subjects to which I turn next.
III. THE USE OF NORMATIVE CANONS IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 69
Try as they might, lawyers and judges do not and cannot derive reliable
answers to a significant minority of difficult questions of statutory interpretation from
the traditional techniques discussed above. Textual language is often ambiguous.
Canons which seek to accurately describe the probable intention of drafters are not
always reliable." The legislative history often does not reveal how the legislature would
69 This part summarizes an ongoing research project concerning normative canons in
general, and the BFP v. Resolution Trust case in particular, infra note 81, currently undertaken
in collaboration with Professor Robert Lawless. See also R.M. Lawless, "Legisprudence Through
a Bankrutpcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases" (1996) 47:1 Syracuse
L. Rev. 1 at 70-77.
71 The hoary canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not necessarily reflect the
realities of drafting lengthy and complicated legislation where there is little time for careful
editing: see Sullivan/Driedger, supra note 5 at 167. (In theory, the greater ministerial control of
Canadian legislation should limit this problem to a greater degree than in the United States).
Similarly, the descriptive accuracy of what Sullivan calls the presumption against tautology (ibid.
at 160, presuming that "words add something which would not be there if the words were left
out," see Hill v. William Hill (Park Lane) Ltd., [1949] A.C. 530 at 547, 2 All E.R. 452 (H.L.)),
may give way in the pressures of modern legislative drafting. In my own legislative experience
as a staff counsel in the United States Senate, it was commonplace for a Senator, aide, or a
lobbyist to suggest a phrase or text intended to achieve a goal with greater certainty. Although
I was quite confident that the existing text adequately achieved the desired result, it was much
easier to incorporate the redundant phrase than to offend the offeror of the additional language.
Professor Sullivan has suggested to me that the control exercised by ministers and their
professional drafters in Canada makes this scenario less likely north of the border, although she
concedes that this tight control has loosened in recent years.
Even linguistic canons that appear to be generally reliable may not be so in particular
cases, often due to oversight in drafting complex legislation. For example, in Montana Wilderness
Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (9"' Cir. 1981), the court considered whether
§ 1323(a) of the Alaska Lands Act of 1980 created a nationwide right of access to national forest
land for owners of private land within the National Forest System. The plaintiffs argued that the
provision applied only to land in Alaska, relying on the stipulation that §1323(b) of the Act
created a right of access to national park land for owners of private land but only for national parks
within the state of Alaska. The court rejected this argument, relying on subsequent legislative
history demonstrating that Congress clearly intended this purpose (Congress deleted a provision
in a statute dealing with forest land in Colorado because of the nationwide access provision): Ibid
at 957. Additional legislative history, apparently not known at the time of the litigation confirms
the accuracy of the court's assessment of the legislative intent: see Cases on Legislation, supra
note 10 at 520 n.a. Although this case has attracted some scholarly attention in the United States,
no one has ever provided an explanation for why two seemingly identical sections would have
been intended to create different effects.
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have resolved the matter at hand. Legislation is usually not directed at a single
overriding purpose. Even ifjudges were inclined to resolve hard cases by imposing their
own view of the best public policy solution, judges do not in fact have strong policy
preferences concerning many of the cases that come before them, and in other cases,
multiple policy preferences can point to opposite results. Although these difficult cases
may be exceptional, it is in these difficult cases that lawyers and judges deploy their
elaborate training. In other words, although these difficult cases are a minority, they are
a minority that matters.
Judges - sometimes without saying so -- often resolve difficult cases using
"normative canons" of interpretation. 7 Normative canons are principles that allow
courts to construe statutory ambiguities in order to further some policy objective, usually
one that is judicially-created.72 These "normative canons" must be analytically
distinguished from interpretive rules with which they are often confused-"descriptive
canons" are grounded in generalizations about what the legislature actually intended, and
what the drafters actually meant. (A good example of a descriptive canon is noscitur a
sociis -interpreting words in light of similar words in the surrounding text.)7 Unlike
descriptive canons, normative canons are created by judges to further some substantive
or procedural outcome.
In some cases, almost everyone recognizes the normative basis of the canon.
For example, the doctrine that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed is not based on any realistic assessment that Parliament and the provincial
legislatures have such a high regard for judge-made law that they would not possibly
want to disturb it except to remedy the narrowest of defects. Indeed, a recent and
thoughtful commentary on British law, by David Robertson, expressly argued against
the use of contextual evidence such as legislative history because of the potential that
" Professor Sullivan criticizes Chief Justice Antonio Lamer's "literalism" in criminal
cases: Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 196-197. Lamer's approach is opaque, however. For
example, in R. v. McIntosh, supra note 8 at 699-703, he engages in the rhetoric of textualism
while applying the normative rule of lenity in criminal cases.
This is not a uniquely Canadian problem. In 1958, Professors Hart and Sacks
complained that American judges needed to ground statutory interpretation decisions on
defensible "policies of clear statement" (what I would call normative canons) rather than
unthinking interpretive rules. Referring to normative canons, they rhetorically asked: "Can the
body of statutory law ever attain any semblance of rationality and consistency unless the courts
continue unremittingly the effort to discern and articulate principles such as these?": Hart &
Sacks, supra note 39 at 1241.
' See S.F. Ross, "Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn its
Lonely Eyes to You?" (1992) 45 V.and L. Rev. 561 at 563. For an excellent empirical study of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the importance of normative canons, see J.S. Schacter,
"The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:
Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond," (1998) 51 Stanford L. Rev. 1.
13 See e.g. R v. Goulis (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 137, 32 O.R. (2d) 55 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter Goulis cited to O.R.](discussed in Sullivan/Driedger, supra note 5 at 200-201). In
Goulis, the court held that a debtor did not illegally "conceal" property by failing to disclose its
existence to the trustee in bankruptcy, because the Criminal Code provided that it was illegal if
one "removes, conceals, or disposes" of the property. Read in that context, the court held that
Parliament intended "a positive act of concealment.": Ibid. at 61.
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legislative sponsors could, with an off-hand comment, trump venerable normative
canons designed to protect civil liberties or other virtues in a legal system that lacks a
written constitution to protect these values.74
The sharpest example of a normative canon is one designed to protect a
politically marginalised group or individual. The rule of lenity for penal statutes and the
canon that resolves all ambiguities in First Nations' treaties in favour of Aboriginals are
two examples. No one seriously suggests that criminal defendants and Aboriginal
peoples are so popular or politically powerful that, as a descriptive matter, courts can
confidently assume that legislatures would only legislate against their interests in the
clearest of terms.
The distinction between what I call descriptive and normative canons is often
confused. For example, although Driedger clearly distinguishes legislative intent that
is expressed in the words of the statute or may be legitimately implied from the enacted
words from the "presumed intention -- the intention that the courts will in the absence
of an indication to the contrary impute to Parliament," he groups all these concepts under
the heading "intention of Parliament."" Although the leading commentators generally
make the distinction clear,76 Professor Sullivan notes that courts will label a normative
canon as a "presumption of intent" and thus falsely suggest that they are giving effect
to legislative policy instead of taking responsibility for the validity of canons of judicial,
not legislative, origin.77
To be sure, in some cases the distinction between normative and descriptive
canons gets murky. Consider the presumption that the legislature intends to comply with
constitutional norms. As Cartwright J. wrote in McKay v. The Queen, when one
interpretation would render a statute ultra vires and another would allow the court to
find the legislation intra vires, the notion that the drafters intended an interpretation that
would result in valid legislation seems descriptively sound.78 As a matter of positive
political science though, the case that legislatures intend to incorporate judicially-
interpreted Charter values, "federalism, the preservation of cultural heritage, comity
among provinces," etc., is much harder to make.79
This is not to suggest that normative canons are normatively wrong. Indeed,
there is a strong normative case for such canons in a constitutional democracy. They
provide a critical intermediate safety-valve that allows the courts to protect politically
marginalised groups and individuals, or other values inherent in the Charter, without
' D. Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House ofLords (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998) at 181.
5 Driedger, supra note 5 at 105-106.
76 See Sullivan/Driedger, supra note 5 (devoting chapters 7 and 9 to descriptive canons
and chapters 14-16 to normative interpretive rules); Ct, supra note 20 (normative canons
discussed in separate chapter 5).
" Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7, at 225.
78 [1965] S.C.R. 798 at 803-804, 53 D.L.R. (2d) 532.
79 Sullivan/Driedger, supra note 5 at 322-323.
8 Two leading American scholars of statutory interpretation have previously defended
this use of normative canons: see C.R. Sunstein, "Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State"
(1989) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405 at 472-473; W.N. Eskridge, Jr., "Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation" (1989) 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007 at 1032-1034.
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having to resort to the brute force of constitutional invalidation. By creating clear
normative canons, courts actually enhance the democratic process by requiring the
government to draft legislation harmful to these values in the clearest possible terms, and
accept whatever political costs are involved in the transparent adoption of public policy.
Indeed, part of the legitimacy of normative canons lies in the ability of the legislature,
through amendment of the Interpretation Act or its provincial equivalent, to short-cut
this process entirely. Moreover, although I note below how normative canons can be
employed for broad ideological ends, the creation of normative canons lessens ad hoc
judicial discretion-where the interpretive result is determined by the judge's
predilections about the "just" result in the particular case.
One American and one Canadian case illustrate the potential uses and abuses
of normative canons. BFP v. Resolution Trust Co.8 demonstrates how normative
canons can be outcome-determinative and can play a more decisive role than a judge's
view of the "best answer" (in the Eskridge & Frickey model). The case also shows the
need for a transparent normative defense of normative canons, and the particular risks
that can arise when normative canons are used in an opaque manner combined with
textualism. An analysis of Haida Nation v. B.C. (Minister of Forests)8 2 reveals the
difficulties with a textualist approach to plain meaning, suggests both descriptive and
normative problems with an intentionalist approach, and offers a normative alternative
as a more satisfactory basis for deciding the case.
BFP v. Resolution Trust Co. involved a federal court bankruptcy proceeding
where the debtor had lost a piece of real estate in a state court foreclosure proceeding.
In the foreclosure, a third party had purchased the property for $433,000. The federal
Bankruptcy Code, like many state statutes governing creditors' rights, allows a debtor
to set aside a "fraudulent transfer," defined in this instance as a prebankruptcy transfer
by a debtor at (or near) insolvency that occurs for less than a "reasonably equivalent
value."83 Claiming the property actually was worth $725,000, the debtor sued to set
aside the foreclosure sale as a pre-bankruptcy transfer for less than a "reasonably
equivalent value," so that the property could be returned to the debtor's estate. BFP, the
third-party purchaser, defended on the grounds that any price obtained at a foreclosure
sale was, by definition, "reasonably equivalent value." A narrow majority of the United
States Supreme Court agreed.
The majority and dissenting Justices seemed to agree that the textual phrase
"reasonably equivalent value" did not have a plain meaning. The author for the
majority, textualist Justice Scalia, refused to review the legislative history to identify any
specific legislative intent on this issue. The dissenters suggested that the text, while
vague, was not consistent with the broad interpretation given by the majority. They also
could point to evidence suggesting that Congress rejected an interpretation that would
have immunized valid foreclosure sales from bankruptcy court review of "reasonable
equivalence" in value: a provision which would have explicitly accomplished this result
was included in the version of the legislation reported by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, but was dropped without explanation during consideration on the Senate
8, 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (5-4 decision).
82 Supra note 4.
83 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
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floor. However, there was no evidence as to how Congress thought courts should
interpret the section. Purposive analysis also seemed unavailing, as the issue in the case
involved the proper balance to be struck between fairness to all creditors and
maintaining the security of title in real estate, and both sides could certainly marshal
evidence to support Congress' desire to promote both goals.
Unlike the critical/realist stereotype of result-oriented judging, neither the
majority nor the dissent appear to have decided this case based on their personal views
of sound bankruptcy policy. 4 Rather, the majority decided the case based on the
normative canon that state law proceedings should not be upset absent a clear statement
by Congress.85 The dissent, in contrast, argued that a "pro-state" normative canon was
inappropriate since: (1) the very purpose of the constitutionally-delegated congressional
power to enact bankruptcy legislation is to supersede state debtor-creditor law; and, (2)
on balance, the best arguments as to legislative intent pointed in favour of a case-by-case
review to determine whether a specific property transfer via foreclosure was really for
a "reasonably equivalent value."86
The decision illustrates several problems with the use of normative canons, and,
in particular, the "federalism" canon invoked by the majority to require that ambiguities
be resolved in favour of state law principles. A grounding of normative canons in values
enshrined in constitutional law would certainly have normative appeal, but at the time
the United States Supreme Court on the role of the states as a matter of constitutional
law adopted the view (over the dissent of the now-ascendant conservatives) that the
American national political process itself reflected adequate protection for state
prerogatives.17 As a matter of American constitutional law, the Court concluded that
states exercise sufficient political power within Congress so that state law prerogatives
will be fully considered by Congress in enacting bankruptcy legislation. Such a finding
might support a weak default canon, as a descriptive matter, in favour of preserving state
laws (i.e., absent evidence to the contrary, judges will assume that Congress intended
state prerogatives to be protected). But there is no basis other than the personal views
of the majority of the Justices to impose a stronger normative canon, especially in the
context of the constitutional delegation, to Congress, of the power to enact bankruptcy
rules.
There is significant merit to the employment of normative canons after a
consideration of the text, legislative intent, and purpose yields no confident conclusion.
" This claim hopefully has intuitive appeal to many readers, who will accept without
rigorous survey research the assertion that most judges simply do not have strongly held policy
views about bankruptcy, nor are they interested in the amount of work it would require to develop
such views.
85 Supra note 81 at 543-545.
86 Ibid. at 550 n. 1 and 569, Souter J. (dissenting opinion).
87 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 at 551, n. I1 and
554 (1985) (citing J.H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980)). But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Much
of the Canadian jurisprudence on federalism, in contrast, is based on the assumption that
provincial interests will not be adequately represented in Ottawa, thus necessitating and justifying
a more active judicial role in federalism questions. See e.g. P.C. Weiler, In the Last Resort
(Toronto: Carswell, 1974) at 174.
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However, to invoke them whenever a skilled judge finds an ambiguity in the words of
a statute is troubling. Canons are rebuttable presumptions, but they are more likely to be
employed where the extrinsic evidence that could be used to rebut the presumptions will
be excluded.88 As a result, a textualist approach results in judge-created normative
canons prevailing over legislative policy decisions. This is particularly problematic in
light of the textualist claim that their project is fundamentally intended to reduce judicial
policy discretion.89
BFP illustrates both the theoretical and practical importance of normative
canons. Resolving all ambiguities in bankruptcy law (and, by implication, all federal
statutes) in favour of what, in Canada, would be the provincial authority over Property
and Civil Rights, raises a variety of interesting and controversial issues relating to
federalism. As a practical matter, such a canon provides counsel whose interpretation
is more closely aligned with state law with a powerful litigating advantage. In the actual
case, the third-party purchaser, who would have had considerable difficulty persuading
any of the Justices to have strong feelings about the case, was able to focus the five most
conservative Justices' attention on something that was near and dear to their
hearts-limiting the federal government at the expense of the states.
BFP illustrates how courts actually use normative canons to determine the
outcome of difficult interpretive cases. Haida Nation illustrates how a fuller and more
satisfactory statement of reasons would have emerged from the use of normative canons
as part of a pragmatic approach. Although the Court of Appeal rejected the lower
court's contextual approach and interpreted the statute in light of the law's perceived
plain meaning, in fact there are serious reasons to question how plain the language was.
On the other hand, there were solid reasons to reject the evidence of intent and purpose
put forth by the defendant. In this context, relying on an express normative canon in
favour of Aboriginals may make more sense than an unsophisticated or sub rosa
invocation of plain meaning to reach the same result.90
The Haida sought judicial review of a tree farm license granted to MacMillan
Bloedel by the B.C. government, on the ground that section 28 of the Forest Act limited
such licenses to "an area of Crown land, the timber on which is not otherwise
encumbered, determined by the minister."9' The Haida claimed Aboriginal title to the
land on which the timber grew, and thus, argued that the timber in question was indeed
"otherwise encumbered" and thus, not subject to a ministerial license. However, the
government successfully persuaded the chambers judge that when the British Columbia
Legislative Assembly used the word "encumbered" in s. 28, it did not intend to include
Aboriginal land claims.
8 "Unknown Ideal," supra note 19 at 1543-1548.
89 See e.g. A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 15 at 25.
" The real-world use of techniques of statutory interpretation to affect the way that a
judge looks at the case was also apparent in Haida Nation, supra note 4. Whatever the defects
in the textualist approach to interpretation, it tends to be favoured by more traditional or
conservative jurists. This conservative appeal was used to good effect by counsel for the Haida,
who successfully invoked the "plain meaning" of the statutory text to ban a potentially significant
amount of new forest activity on property subject to an aboriginal land claim, a goal that might
not be expected to find sympathy with many traditional or conservative jurists.
91 Forest Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 140, s. 28(1)(b)(i) (now R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157).
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The B.C. Court of Appeal reversed the trial courtjudgment. Justice Esson saw
"no reason to doubt that, as a matter of plain or grammatical meaning, the Aboriginal
title claimed by the Haida Nation, if it exists, constitutes an encumbrance on the
Crown's title to the timber."9' This, in his view, was the beginning and end of the
matter.
The lower court had agreed with arguments, made by counsel for the Crown
and MacMillan Bloedel, that s. 28 should be construed to apply to other forms of forest
tenures (such as pre-existing limited or unlimited timber and pulp licenses) and not
Aboriginal rights, for several reasons. First, counsel argued that the purpose of the
Forest Act was to provide for forest management and timber harvesting, not to advance
Aboriginal land claims. The Haida position, if accepted, would completely alter the
entire system of forest tenures contemplated by the Forest Act. Second, counsel noted
(using the accepted and generally accurate descriptive canon in pari materia) that tree
licenses required for foresting on private land are not subject to the qualification that the
timber thereon not be "otherwise encumbered," arguing that if the legislature had
intended for the Ministry of Forests to withhold tree licenses for timber on Crown land
subject to Aboriginal claims, surely it would have provided the same limit on private
land subject to similar claims.93
As is the nature of the textualist project, Esson J.A. did not need to respond to
the arguments that the B.C. Supreme Court had found persuasive. Indeed, the Court of
Appeal reached its judgment94 despite Justice Esson's acknowledgment that it was
"likely that those who drafted and those who voted for [the statute], had they considered
at all the question of whether timber could be 'otherwise encumbered' by Aboriginal
title, would have said no" because of the position that the Attorney General of the
province had been taking in contemporaneous Native land claims litigation.9"
In her recent article, Professor Sullivan provides a number of strong arguments
as to why interpretation cannot take place without an inquiry into the context in which
the text was drafted.' Although the majority expressly rejected Sullivan's approach in
Haida, the reasons for judgment are necessarily incomplete and, as Huddart J.A. noted,
are likely to result in an interpretation "derived from judicial intuition with hidden
assumptions."97 Justice Esson's opinion that the term "encumbered" plainly includes
Aboriginal land claims fails to account for: (1) the lower court's conclusion that a broad
interpretation of the word "encumbered" to include Aboriginal land claims was contrary
92 Supra note 4 at 5.
93 See Haida Nation, supra note 4 at 661, 668-69.
" Southin J.A. agreed with Justice Esson's plain meaning argument: Ibid. at 18.
Huddart J.A. concurred in the result, but stated that she was "not....of the plain meaning school"
and, stating a preference for Professor Sullivan's approach, nevertheless (without further
elaboration) concluded that the meaning of encumbrance was so clear that intentional or
contextual arguments to the contrary could not be accepted: Ibid. at 19.
" Ibid. at 16.
96 Sullivan/Ottawa supra note 7.
97 Haida Nation, supra note 4 at 19. See also Regie d'alcool, supra note 3 at 997
L'Heureux-Dubd J. ("the principal failing of the 'plain meaning' process is the following: it
obscures the fact that the so-called 'plain meaning' is based on a set of underlying assumptions that
are concealed in legal reasoning").
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to the purposes of the Forests Act, (2) the intrinsic clue of legislative intent that forest
licenses on private land were inexplicably not made subject to similar restrictions, and
(3) the extrinsic clue of legislative intent that the province's Attorney General was taking
the legal position that Native land claims were not valid.
There are two ways to explain the court's conclusion in light of these claims
that the legislature intended a contrary meaning. One is that the clues about legislative
intent were misleading and wrong, and that the Legislature did indeed intend to include
Aboriginal land claims within the terms of the Forest Act. Although the Forest Act may
have been intended broadly to further policy goals concerning forest management and
timber harvesting, this does not necessarily mean that such goals should be
accomplished without regard to other societal values. Indeed, the qualification
contained in s. 28 makes it clear that the Legislature believed that the Minister's
discretion to issue tree farm licenses should not interfere with clearly established third
party property rights claims in the land or timber subject to the license. Once the
legislative purpose is seen as facilitating sound forestry practices subject to existing
property rights, the Haida's interpretation of s. 28 seems less contrary to legislative
purpose. Although the differential treatment of Crown and private land for purposes of
Aboriginal land claims is not apparent, neither is the differential treatment of Crown and
private land for purposes of more traditional clouds on title.
As to the imaginative reconstruction of the intent of the legislators voting for
the 1978 legislation enacting s. 28, the question posed and then dismissed by Esson J.A.
(whether they would have considered that timber could be "otherwise encumbered" by
Aboriginal title) is, with respect, arguably the wrong question. Perhaps a better question
to ask M.L.A.'s would have been whether timber could be "otherwise encumbered" if,
as it turned out, the Attorney General was wrong about Aboriginal title and that such
title did indeed exist (as the Court subsequently held"8 ). The reported decisions provide
no basis to answer such a speculative question with any degree of certainty.
Thus, it may well be that the Legislature meant exactly what it seemed to say
when it denied the Minister the discretion to issue tree farm licenses to any timber that
was "otherwise encumbered." However the only way to reach this conclusion with any
confidence is to make the sort of contextual inquiries discussed in the paragraphs above.
Another possibility, of course, is that the contextual evidence correctly reflects
the Legislature's expectations, and that the reason that they used the phrase "otherwise
encumbered" to refer only to traditional forest tenures is that the phrase does not have
the "plain meaning" that the B.C. Court of Appeal attaches to it. Indeed, unrefuted
contextual evidence that the Legislature attached a meaning to the phrase different than
the one held by the court would seem to be primafacie evidence that the text's meaning
is not plain. Unfortunately, this observation is all too often lost by judges who derive
their interpretations from intuition and hidden assumptions.99
9' R. v. Sparrow (1986), 36 D.L.R. (4h) 246, 9 B.C.L.R. (2d) 300 (B.C.C.A.), aff'd
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
99 See Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 202. For a rare and refreshing contrary view,
see Alberta (Treasury Branches) v. Canada, [1996] 1 S.C.R 963 at 976-77, 133 D.L.R. (4th) 609
Cory J. ("the very history of this case with the clear differences of opinion expressed as between
the trial judges and the Court of Appeal of Alberta indicates that for able and experienced legal
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A third possibility is that the phrase "otherwise encumbered" does indeed have
a plain meaning and that the Legislature's use of that phrase to signify a narrower
concept was the result of sloppy drafting. Courts may well wish to follow plain meaning
in these cases, but they need a normative justification for doing so, and it is difficult to
reach generalizations without the contextual inquiry that the B.C. Court of Appeal
rejects. One rationale might be that the plain meaning is so likely to reflect actual
legislative intent that an inquiry is wasteful. There are too many cases where judges
have reached anti-intentional results using plain meaning to justify this argument, as the
British House of Lords recently recognized in overturning their long-standing refusal
to consult legislative debate. 0
Another argument for deliberately ignoring sloppy drafting is to "teach the
Legislature a lesson" and to encourage greater drafting precision. The propriety of the
judiciary acting as a scolding nanny is questionable in a system based on legislative
supremacy. In labour contexts, after all, "work to rule" regardless of intent is usually a
hostile, non-cooperative act.' ' Moreover, the realities of a legislative process featuring
complex legislation and sophisticated special interest lobbying suggests that courts need
to appreciate who are the "victims" and "beneficiaries" of imprecise drafting. Some
American decisions support the proposition that the courts will not generously interpret
sloppily-drafted legislation benefitting well-represented special interests, but are willing
to overlook oversights in other contexts. 2
Textualists may claim that "rule of law" principles of fair notice dictate that the
courts not rescue legislatures from their sloppy drafting. This certainly has appeal in the
criminal context, and it is no accident that Professor Sullivan discusses this issue in that
context.'03 The rule of lenity, though, is better understood as incorporating Charter
values intended to protect the innocent and the criminally accused rather than a general
principle of notice. Consider the issue in the context of the Haida Nation case - the
principal "victims" of sloppy drafting seem to be the drafter itself (the Minister of
Forests), and MacMillan Bloedel, who doubtlessly protects itself already against sloppy
drafting through the retention of skilled legislative counsel.'
Ultimately, we cannot say with confidence whether the phrase "otherwise
encumbered" encompasses Native land claims not contemplated when the statute was
minds, neither the meaning of the legislation nor its application to the facts is clear.").
'o Pepper v. Hart, supra note 24.
101 M.A. Eisenberg, "Strict Textualism" (1995), 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. at 13, 37.
102 Compare Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d
667 at 671-72 (7 Cir. 1992) (courts read special interest exceptions "narrowly, with beady eyes
and green eyeshades") with Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d 583 (l' Cir. 1986) Breyer J. (refusing to
adhere to plain meaning of statute appearing to permit a spouse to discharge a debt arising out of
a particular type of pre-divorce alimony order, in recognition of hasty drafting process and clear
legislative intent to expand, not contract, family law obligations that were non-dischargeable in
bankruptcy).
103 Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 182 (discussing R v. McIntosh, supra note 8). See
also R. v. Hasselwander, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 398 (questioning vitality of rule of lenity).
"o In contrast, millions of Canadian taxpayers and their accountants rely on the text of
tax legislation for business planning purposes, and so notice principles have stronger support in
this area. See Regie d'alcool, supra note 3, at 1011-1015, L'Heureux-Dubd J. (explaining why
the plain meaning rule has greater force in taxation cases that with ordinary statutes).
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written, whether the legislature really intended to permit or deny ministerial discretion
to grant tree farm licenses on lands subject to as yet unrecognized Aboriginal land
claims, or whether consideration of Native land claims would or would not frustrate the
ForestAct's purposes. Instead, the most satisfactory basis for resolving this issue would
have been to give weight to a normative canon: in disputes between the government and
politically powerful private interests on the one hand, and politically marginalised First
Nations on the other, courts should resolve ambiguities in favour of Aboriginal interests.
This canon builds upon, but is analytically distinct from, the well-established
canon that federal legislation relating to First Nations or Aboriginal people receive a
large and purposive interpretation.' 5 That canon is based on the trust relationship that
the federal government assumed for itself over Native peoples and Native lands. In
cases arising under this canon, the federal government was typically the drafter of
textual language reflecting a contract with Native people, or acting as the trustee for
such people. Thus, the traditional Aboriginal canon is best seen as a logical extension
of the contract law principle that ambiguities will be construed against a sophisticated
drafter in favour of the unsophisticated party,0 6 or to the special fiduciary relationship
that the government had assumed.'0 7
As the Crown correctly argued, Haida Nation does not involve an interpretation
of a treaty or legislation specifically relating to Aboriginal rights. Indeed, the Crown's
argument was that the Forest Act did not seek to legislate regarding Aboriginal rights
at all. Nonetheless, strong normative arguments drawn from the Charter, and the goal
of enhancing deliberative democracy, point to resolving statutory issues like those raised
in Haida Nation in favour of Aboriginal interests.
In a related context, the Supreme Court of Canada has accepted the idea that
"Charter values" should play a role in judicial decision-making in cases that do not
necessarily involve a claim that a specific governmental act is invalid for inconsistency
with the Charter. In Hill v. Church of Scientology,0 8 the Court held that, although the
common law was not itself a governmental act subject to the Charter under s.32, the
common law of defamation had to be reconsidered in light of the Charter's adoption in
"oS See Sullivan/Ottawa, supra note 7 at 224. Even Dickson C.J.C., one of the most
vigourous proponents of the canon, expressly limited it to treaties and legislation that specifically
relate to Native peoples: Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.RL 85 at 99-100, 71 D.L.R.
(4t) 193.
"0 See, e.g. Hillis Oil & Sales v. Wynn's Canada, Ltd., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 57 at 68-69,
25 D.L.R. (4") 649.
107 R v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at 537, 137 D.L.R. (4"') 289 (principle in
favour of broad and liberal interpretation of legislation relating to Aboriginals "arises from the
nature of the relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples. The Crown has a fiduciary
obligation to aboriginal peoples with the result that in dealings between the government and
aboriginals the honour of the Crown is at stake.") An American scholar (relying on the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), Marshall
C.J.) argues for a normative canon construing Indian treaties to preserve the sovereignty of Indian
tribes unless expressly abrogated: P.P. Frickey, "Marshaling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law" (1993) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381.
"' Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 126 D.L.R. (4"') 129.
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1982 to accommodate "Charter values."'1 9
These values should likewise play a role in resolving difficult statutory cases.
Section 35 of the Charter, by constitutionally affirming and recognizing Aboriginal
rights, reflects a recognition that ordinary political processes are insufficient to protect
Aboriginal interests adequately. Such a recognition can be contrasted with the rejection
of the need for judicial protection against the potential that Parliament and provincial
legislatures might unduly impair economic liberty or property rights. At the same time,
constitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights can be analogized to the inclusion in the
Charter of sections 8 through 14, which similarly reflect a recognition that inflamed
temporary majorities might, absent constitutional restraint, unduly affect the application
of fair and natural justice for those accused of crime. From this perspective, section 35
not only constitutionally proscribes governmental acts such as the extinguishing of
Aboriginal title"' or the prohibition of an Aboriginal practice, custom or tradition
integral to distinctive Aboriginal culture"' but also creates an interpretive canon that
requires that legislators seeking to enact laws that adversely affect Aboriginal interests
must do so with clarity.
A normative canon in favour of Aboriginal interests can also be justified as
democracy-enhancing." 2 Consider again the issue raised by Haida Nation, where the
effect of Aboriginal land claims on forestry practices was not considered when the B.C.
Legislative Assembly enacted the Forest Act, because such claims were not thought to
exist. Whatever result was reached by the courts in the actual case, once Aboriginal
claims to vast amounts of B.C. forest land were recognized, the best result would surely
have been a legislative reconsideration of the extent to which these claims should be
considered in authorizing tree fanning. In light of the relative political power of the
Forest Ministry, MacMillan Bloedel, and the Haida Nation, there is little question that
the best means to assure express legislative deliberation on this issue is to create a
"default rule" in favour of the Haida. If there is political support for allowing tree
farming on disputed forest land, there should be little difficulty in allowing the majority
to work its will through the legislative process. The likelihood that the Haida, had they
lost their case, could have persuaded a Social Credit government to put the matter on the
legislative agenda is far slimmer, a political reality recognized by section 35 of the
Charter."3
"9 Ibid. at 1165 (citing RWDSUv. Dolphin Delivery, Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 603,
33 D.L.R. (4") 174). The Court then concluded (at 1172-1179) that the inhibition of the value of
free expression reflected in s.2(b) of the Charter inherent in the award of damages for defamation
was reasonable in light of the strong and traditional concern for protection of reputation reflected
in the common law.
"o See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 D.L.R. (4') 193.
" R. v. Van der Peet, supra note 107.
12 For the proposition that, indeed, the primary role of judicial review is to create
doctrines that facilitate democratic processes, see P.J. Monahan, "Judicial Review and Democracy:
A Theory of Judicial Review" (1987) 21 U.B.C. L. Rev. 87.
1' This argument has stronger force in Canada than in the United States, where
bicameralism, weak party discipline, and minority procedural rights make it difficult to predict
confidently that a majority can necessarily work its will in the legislative process. To be sure,
there may be political costs to a government seeking to correct ajudicial statutory interpretation
decision, but the need for the corrction was, in some sense, caused by the government's own
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The foregoing discussion demonstrates the difficulty with reliance on textualist,
intentional, or purposive approaches to difficult questions of statutory interpretation, and
the need and inevitability of normative canons that will resolve these issues (whether or
not explicitly acknowledged by the judges in their reasons for decision). The analysis
also provides an initial basis to evaluate the desirability of particular normative canons
that might be invoked. This is only one of a host of issues of statutory interpretation that
deserve fuller attention, in Canada and elsewhere.
IV. A CALL TO CANADIAN TEACHERS AND SCHOLARS
With her revisions to Driedger on the Constructions of Statutes and her attack
on plain meaning and call for a more explicit and pragmatic interpretive process in
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada, Professor Ruth Sullivan will
hopefully re-ignite widespread interest in the theory and practice of statutory
interpretation throughout Canada."' This Part briefly sketches some ideas on how she
and others might further the inquiry.
A. Teaching law students about statutory interpretation
Most North American law schools initially responded to the post-war
transformation of our legal system from the common law to an "age of statutes" by
ignoring it. Today, first-year classes still focus almost exclusively on the few remaining
areas where the common law methodology remains paramount. Even in courses on
company, labour, tax, or environmental law that are today primarily governed by statute,
instructors have enough trouble covering difficult and important substantive principles
and have little time or inclination to delve into the interpretive methodology of the cases
studied. Two alternatives deserve consideration.
At a minimum, law schools ought to offer a course on statutory interpretation
(Professor Sullivan does at Ottawa). Such a course can provide students with a sound
theoretical understanding of the various approaches to statutory interpretation utilized
by the courts as well as a technical understanding of particular interpretive canons. A
well-designed course has the potential to permit a serious discussion of important
jurisprudential issues about separation of powers, "judicial activism," and the
reconciliation of the rule of law with justice in the case. Such a course will also provide
graduates with powerful tools to improve their advocacy of the clients' interests on
imprecise drafting. To the extent that the government is reluctant to introduce new forestry
legislation, for example, because it would give the opposition a political opportunity to debate
government policies in the area, the normative canon I propose here would seem to facilitate
democratic debate and thus be democracy-enhancing.
1" Until Elmer Driedger's publication of the first edition of his treatise in 1974, there
had not been any substantial work on Canadian statutory interpretation since the 1930s: H.W.
MacLauchlan, Book Review of Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d ed by R.E. Sullivan,
(1995) 41 McGill L.J. 185 at 188. MacLauchlan notes that students in the 1970s were still
studying the landmark work of J.A. Corry, "Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes"
(1935-36) 1 U.T.L.L 286, and J. Willis, "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938) 16 Can. Bar
Rev. 1. See also R.C.B. Risk, "John Willis - A Tribute" (1985) 9 Dalhouse L.J. 521.
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statutory issues. As I tell my students, whether they go into court seeking vindication
of the "plain meaning" of a statute, or seeking to disregard the most obvious meaning
in favour of a more purposive approach, they will have a natural advantage over
opposing counsel who can only throw unthinking bromides into their arguments without
a good understanding of the theoretical underpinning of their arguments.
Beyond that, Canadian schools might consider an experimental approach
undertaken at the University of Illinois, where first-year students select from among a
number of elective courses concerning statutory law (prior examples include welfare,
employment discrimination, bankruptcy, copyright, and disabilities law) where the
principal goal is to use the statutes as a context for teaching about statutory interpretation
rather than disseminating substantive legal doctrines. Some courses provide an
introduction to the substantive law, then an introduction to statutory interpretation,
followed by a synthesis of the two. Others include a detailed study of the legislative
procedures that led to the adoption of a particular statute, and (aided by computer-search
tools) find cases interpreting the relevant statutes that invoke canons of interpretation,
the plain meaning rule, intentionalist and purposive approaches, the use of legislative
history, and the like. Alternatively, students already familiar with a field of statutory
law, like tax or environmental law, could take an advanced course studying interpretive
techniques within the context of a legal regime with which they are already familiar.
B. Academic development of the field
Statutory interpretation issues cry out for further elucidation by the Canadian
academy. Professor Sullivan's attack on the mythology of plain meaning jurisprudence
warrants critique or validation. A variety of other areas have not even been explored.
Many of the interpretive rules catalogued in the treatises deserve critical examination.
Some examples:
* Are there any categories of statutes where legislatures really do intend to
leave the common law undisturbed except where being manifestly derogated? What are
the normative arguments in favour of presuming an intent to preserve the common law?
* Do legislatures really intend that their acts be construed consistently with
constitutional law? With international law? If not, what arguments support such a
presumption?
* What is the jurisprudential support for, and limits on, the rule of lenity in
criminal cases? The rule of liberal construction for social welfare legislation? What
should be the default presumption in tax cases?
* Just as the economic rights of property owners are protected by presumptions
against encroachment on the enjoyment of property rights,"' should the economic rights
of the poor be protected by judicially-created presumptions in their favour? To what
extent would the use of such a presumption obviate some of the traditional objections
to the constitutionalizing of a social charter?" 6
* Do grammatical rules of construction, such as in pari materia, noscitur a
"5 Ct6, supra note 20 at 401-404.
116 See, e.g. J. Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1997)atchapter 9.
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socils, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, and the presumption against surplus language,
reflect the modem day realities of legislative drafting?
As to these inquiries and some others, a fair amount of work has already been
done in the United States." 7 In at least two areas, fundamentally different issues arise
in the context of a nation featuring bicameral legislatures, weak party discipline, and a
separation of executive and legislative power and one featuring (functionally)
unicameral legislatures, strong party discipline, and cabinet government. Specifically,
I refer to legislative history and the role of agencies in statutory interpretation.
In some cases, the argument for legislative history is much stronger in
parliamentary democracies than in the United States. Consider Pepper v. Hart,"' the
path-breaking British case permitting judicial reference to Hansard. The legislative
history consisted of an unequivocal statement made by the minister responsible for the
legislation about the intended meaning of a technical phrase, during careful committee
deliberations where the bill was being re-drafted. As the House of Lords properly
concluded, parliamentarians should be able to reasonably rely on such comments, and
because in British (as well as Canadian) politics, the Minister's view of legislation will
prevail. Although American courts will often rely on statements by the committee chair
or bill's sponsor, no single American legislator packs the political wallop of a British or
Canadian minister.
In other cases, legislative debate may be less reliable in Canada than in
analogous American contexts. For example, suppose a bill's sponsor provides
assurances to a member of the Opposition that a legislative provision will not have the
adverse effects feared by the opponent. Especially in the United States Senate, a strong
argument can be made that this statement should be given effect, because the assurance
may well have led the inquiring senator to acquiesce in the bill's speedy passage and
forego the many dilatory tactics that individual senators enjoy (such as unlimited debate
absent cloture voted by sixty of 100 senators). The analysis is more complex in the
Canadian context. The substance of the answer given to the inquiry is likely to be
irrelevant, since party discipline will ensure that the government has the power to pass
the bill regardless of how favourable or unfavourable the answer given to an opposition
parliamentarian. Moreover, legislative super-majorities are not required to pass ordinary
legislation in Canada. On the other hand, Canadian federal and provincial governments
go to great lengths to avoid the political costs of legislation that may prove unpopular
with various interests across the country or province, and there is something to the
argument that if the government wants to "sell" a bill to its constituents by providing
certain assurances about the bill's effects in response to legislative questions, the courts
should hold the government to its "warranty." In short, Professor Ct6 is correct in
observing that "not all extrinsic materials have the same value in interpretation,"" 9 but
much more work can be done to assist judges in identifying the context in which
17 Cases on Legislation, supra note 10, is an excellent reference source.
"8 Supra note 24.
"9 C6td, supra note 20 at 366.
1999-2000]
Ottawa Law Revue / Revue de droit d'Ottawa
materials are most and least reliable. 2 '
A significant number of old-growth trees from B.C. forests have probably
ended up being used in the United States for judicial decisions, books, and law review
articles concerning the question of curial deference to administrative agency decisions
in interpreting statutes. But different problems are raised when legislative and executive
powers are combined. In the landmark Chevron case, the United States Supreme Court
insisted on curial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of their own statute,
unless Congress has clearly addressed the "precise question at issue" in the case. 2' One
of the problems with curial deference is illustrated by the Chevron case itself. An
environmental statute passed in 1977, when centre-left Democrats controlled the House
of Representatives, the Senate and the White House, was designed to require industry
to do everything practically possible to improve air quality in areas of the country still
subject to significant pollution. In 1983, the agency, now controlled by conservative
Republicans, changed regulations to permit some industrial improvements that did not
improve air quality as much as possible. If the agency had proposed a statutory
amendment to effectuate this policy, it would clearly have been rejected by the House,
still controlled by the Democrats. Instead, the agency prevailed in court, and of course
the House Democrats were powerless to overturn the decision by legislation, which
would have been vetoed by President Reagan.
These problems are absent in Canada. Suppose the conservative government
in Ontario wanted to re-think the policies behind Orders in Council issued by the
previous social democratic government. Requiring them to pass new legislation, rather
than granting the government the leeway to interpret broadly-worded legislation through
new Orders in Council, seems to be an exercise in empty formalities since the
government could with relative ease enact new governing legislation through the
provincial parliament.
These two points are not offered to confidently assert how Canadians ought to
resolve these issues, but merely to suggest rich areas that deserve the attention of
Canadian scholars. Academic inquiry will not only provide jurisprudential insights, but
also provide additional understanding of interpretive tools that are often poorly used by
judges. This is not because the courts are cravenly grasping at ill-fitting interpretive
techniques to achieve a pre-ordained result, but simply because the courts have not been
provided with the rigorous analysis they need to better interpret statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Canadian jurisprudence will surely benefit from any discussion of
fundamental approaches to statutory interpretation, judges and lawyers will continue to
pragmatically interpret statutes, drawing upon a host of textual, contextual and canonical
tools to do their work. Serious attention to the use of interpretive canons that are based
20 See e.g. S. Beaulac, "Parliamentary Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question
of Admissibility or of Weight?" (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 287; G.A. Costello, "Average Voting
Members and Other 'Benign Fictions': The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor
Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History" (1990) Duke L.J. 39.
,23 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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on judicially-created norms will provide superior rationales for many difficult cases of
statutory interpretation. In particular, Canadian courts should seriously consider the use
of Charter values to create default rules for interpretation, such as a presumption that,
in the absence of clear legislative intent, statutes should be construed in favour of
Aboriginal interests. The corpusjuris of Canadian law will also benefit from a rigorous
analysis of existing interpretive canons, the use of legislative history, and the proper
relationship between courts and agencies in statutory interpretation.
American scholars in jurisprudence, constitutional and administrative law, as
well as those toiling in substantive law fields dominated by statutes, have benefitted
enormously by the outpouring of inquiry into statutory interpretation. Hopefully, the
"Cinderella of legal scholarship" will dance in your home and native land as well.

